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       ABSTRACT 
       Metaphors are very important for Economics as Science, both in terms of reasoning and 
rationale, and in its teaching. The "Tragedy of the Commons" is a very particular example, 
originating in the scientific area of the Natural Resources and Environment Economy of one of 
these metaphors and their effects. Dealing with property rights lends itself to misunderstandings 
since important researchers in this area do not distinguish between "common property" and 
"nonproperty", although this definition is crucial for the design of the Natural Resources 
Management Policy. Along this paper it is intended to rectify this confusion and to establish an 
adequate conceptualization. 
         Key words Tragedy of the commons, Property rights, Natural resources,Fisheries, 
Common property, Nonproperty. 
  
       INTRODUCTION 
       Metaphors are very important for Economics as Science, both in terms of reasoning and 
rationale, and in its teaching. In McCluskey (1983) it is recalled that most metaphors and other 
theoretical tools are central to the development of research. Some of these metaphors and 
allegories are an essential aid for the explanation of certain concepts and for their 
operationalization. But, we must not forget it, reflect a special vision of its user and the 
intersection of meanings that is characteristic of it can cause confusion.  
       The ever-mentioned "Tragedy of the Commons" is a very particular example, originating in 
the scientific area of the Natural Resources and Environment Economy, of one of these 
metaphors and their effects. Especially interesting in its content and consequences may, by 
insufficient definition of the meaning of the term common, lead to a confusion that is reflected in 
the actual definition of public policy. 
       According to Schalager and Ostrom (1992): "Political economists” understanding of 
property rights and the rules used to create and enforce property rights perceptions of resource 
degradation problems and the prescriptions recommended to solve such problems. Ambiguous 
terms blur analytical and prescriptive clarity. The term "common property" is a glaring example 
(...) ". In fact, in the economic literature on natural resources, it must be difficult to find a 
concept so definitely misunderstood as "common" and "common property" (Coelho, 2003, 
1999). According to Bromley (1991), important researchers in this area do not distinguish 
between "common property" and "nonproperty", although this definition is crucial for the design 
of the Natural Resources Management Policy. 
       This paper seeks to rectify this confusion and to establish an adequate conceptualization. In 
this context, the chapter discusses the concept of Commons by drawing attention to the legacy of 
Professor Elinor Ostrom (First point) and establishes a typology of property rights regimes 
relevant to the case of common property (Next point). Last point develops this conceptualization 
for the case of fisheries, highlighting the diversity of situations and institutional frameworks. The 
reflection of the distinction between regimes for the design of public policies is discussed. 
 
       ABOUT COMMONS                 
       In the literature on Natural Resource Economics and Environment it is difficult to find such 
an unclear concept as "common" or "common property". The term is used repeatedly to refer to 
very different situations and which include: state ownership, "no-man's property," owned and 
defended by a community of users, any common stock (or common pool, as is known in the 
English terminology) used by multiple individuals regardless of the type of property rights 
involved. In particular, the "unfortunate tradition" of failing to acknowledge that the distinction 
between common property (res communes) and free access (res nullius) is critical (Bromley, 
1991). 
       The problem begins four decades ago with Gordon's (1954) article on fisheries, where the 
author uses the term "common property" to refer to free access. This confusion remains in the 
writings of well-known authors of property rights theory, especially Demsetz (1967), in his 
writings on "communal property". And is reinforced by Hardin (1968) in the always quoted 
allegory "The Tragedy of the Commons." The issue has often been raised (see Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(1971), Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and Bromley (1985, 1986, 1991)) with no great 
impact on its use. Some scholars, even the most meticulous [e. g. Clark (1990) ], use the terms 
common property and free access without differentiation. 
       The current situation stems largely from the fact that none of the authors cited offers a clear 
and coherent discussion of the meaning of "rights", "property", or "property rights", before 
Authority, the problems arising from "common property". 
       First, to correct confusion, we must recognize that the term property refers not to a natural 
object or resource but to the flow of benefits that derives from the use of that object or resource 
(Bromley, 1991). In common language, land and property are terms that are confused, but, in 
essence, ownership is the flow of benefits that a user currently holds and which the state and 
society agree to protect. When economists think of property they are tending to think of an 
object, in fact, and when they think of common property, they accept the idea of the joint use of 
that object. This leads to the uncritical acceptance of the aphorism "owned by all, it is not owned 
by anyone". In fact, it is only right to say that "property to which all have free access is not 
owned by anyone" (Bromley, 1991). 
       Once ownership is understood as flow of benefits, it is important to consider the concept of 
rights and duties. Thus, a right is the ability, duly sustained by the community, to claim a flow of 
benefits. When the collective protects the rights of someone, it does imposing and supervising 
duties on others. 
        At the same time, it should be borne in mind that at the heart of the notion of property is a 
social relation. For Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), property rights do not refer to relations 
between men and things, but rather to the sanctioned behaviour and relationships between men 
that result from the existence of things and possession over their use. Therefore, there is nothing 
inherent in a resource that absolutely determines the nature of property rights. The nature of 
ownership and the specification of rights to resources are determined by the members of society 
and by the rules and conventions they choose and establish regarding the use of resources, not by 
the resource itself. 
        In this sense, rights are not relations between the individual and an object or resource, but 
rather relationships between individuals, with respect to access and use of that object or resource 
i.e., their associated income stream. Rights can only exist when there is a social mechanism that 
assigns duties and obliges individuals to these duties. As Alchian and Demsetz (1973, p. 17) 
reminded us: "What is possessed is the rights to use resources ... and these rights are always 
circumscribed by the prohibition of certain actions (...). Socially recognized actions ". 
         It should be noted that the controversy surrounding the use of the term "common property" 
stems, in part, from the different underlying philosophies on which traditional and Western / 
scientific views of resource management are based. The most widely held contemporary Western 
view is that ownership is either private or owned by the state. In this view, resources that are not 
susceptible to private appropriation are called "common property." This does not mean that the 
resource is collective property of a group, but rather that it is not owned by anyone - it is a free 
good. For example, marine resources are often defined in the law of the western nations as 
"owned by no one and belonging to everyone" (NOAA, 1985). According to this definition of 
common property, these resources are, basically, resources of free access, captured at zero price 
by any user. 
         In a second view, closer to tradition, common property should be restricted to communally 
owned resources, i.e. those resources for which there are communal arrangements / rules for the 
exclusion of non-members and for the use and allocation of resources between co -owners. The 
concept of common property in this sense is well established in formal institutions such as either 
the Anglo-Saxon Common-Law or the Roman law (Scott, 1983). It is equally well established in 
informal arrangements based on custom and tradition (see Ruddle and Panayotou, 1989), 
Acheson (1981), FAO (1983), Panayotou (1984)). 
          Thus "economists should not freely use the concept of" common property resources "or" 
common "where there are no institutional correspondent arrangements. Common property is not 
"owned by everyone". The concept implies that potential users who are not members of the co-
equal-owners group are excluded. The concept of "ownership" has no meaning without this 
characteristic. In any case, inaccuracies in the use of this term will tend to remain, given the 
usual legal definition of resources (fisheries, among them) as common property, in the sense of 
free goods, in detriment of another, more traditional, in the sense of "communal ownership". 
 
        ABOUT NATURAL RESOUCES AND TYPOLOGIES OF PROPERTY REGIMES 
        One solution to overcoming the impasse around the term common property is the distinction 
between resources and regime. In fact, a particular resource can be used under different 
ownership regimes. Bromley (1991) suggests four possible regimes for natural resources. These 
regimes are defined by the structure of rights and duties that characterize the individual domains 
of choice: State Property; Private property; Common Property and Free Access ("non-property" 
in the author's terminology) 
        State ownership is a property regime in which individuals have duties to observe regarding 
the use of resources, in the face of an agency that holds the rights to determine the rules of access 
to resources. As to the second regime, private property, individuals have the right to develop 
socially accepted uses and have a duty not to exceed them beyond socially acceptable limits. 
         Common ownership is that in which the group that manages the resource, the "owners", 
have the right to exclude other non-members and non-members have a duty to comply with the 
exclusion; Members of a management group (co-owners) also have rights and duties with respect 
to the use and conservation of resources. Already, in a regime of free access no group of users or 
owners can be identified. The flow of benefits from the resource is available to anyone; 
Individuals have both the privilege and no duty with respect to the use and conservation of the 
resource. 
         The author thus reaffirms very clearly the difference between what he regards as a "true" 
common property resource (res communes) and a regime of free access (res nullius). In fact, for 
authors like Bromley, it is important to recognize that "common property resource" (using the 
expression of Gordon, 1954) is one for which the group of co-owners is well defined and for 
which they have established a management regime for the determination of usage rates. Thus, 
common property, designates a regime that somehow reminds us of "private ownership of a set 
of co-owners." It is true that decision-making autonomy is lower than in the case of private 
property, in particular in terms of the transferability of rights. But, in a deeper analysis, the 
internal decision-making process is sufficiently diverse to warrant the maintenance of the 
autonomous concept of "common property". 
       While free access presupposes the non-existence of property rights over resources, clearly 
defined and audited; the "true" common property is defined by the impossibility of access to 
well-defined non-owners and rights, with respect for the use of resources, by the group of co-
owners. These common property resources, of which the common forests of Japan (Iriachi), the 
common pastures of the Swiss Alps, certain coastal fisheries of the Americas, are examples, have 
been well managed over the centuries. Contrary to the idea of circulating about the tragedy of 
conservation commons, it is apparent that these resources are not led to inefficient use, precisely 
because of their common property status. The work of Nobel laureate Prof. Elinor Ostrom has 
been particularly significant in launching the idea that, faced with problems of common resource 
management, co-users can cooperate and self-regulate resources. In this sense, the tragedy of the 
Commons, as described by Hardin in his article of 1968, which in the case of fisheries is 
translated into overexploitation of resources and overcapacity of the sector, can become a kind of 
Drama of the Commons. Certainly we can face tragedies (in situations of free access) but we will 
also have good reasons to laugh (in situations of co-management of natural resources used in a 
community perspective). 
        Another proposal to overcome the considerable confusion that results from the application 
of the standard expression "common property resources" to situations other than shared 
ownership (res communes) is that advanced by authors such as Randall (1983). For this author, 
who also suggests that the term should not be used to describe free access regimes, the term 
could even be abolished. It emphasizes, however, that the terms non-exclusive and non-rival 
represent a considerable advance, of use in several contexts, and relevant for both goods and 
resources. 
         In fact, the consideration of non-exclusivity and rivalry is very common today. For Berkes 
and Farvar (1989), regardless of differences, all common property resources share two important 
characteristics: on the one hand, exclusion, or control of access and use of resources, is 
problematic; On the other hand, each user, by increasing their consumption, decreases the 
consumption of the rest, is able to "subtract" the well-being of the other users, i.e., there is rivalry 
in the consumption. Common property resources are thus defined as a class of resources for 
which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves rivalry. 
         This view can itself be criticized. Bromley (1991) points out that non-exclusivity and 
rivalry refer particularly to the physical and economic aspects of a specific natural resource, 
which is insufficient because in the identification of the property regime it is not only a matter of 
describing the attributes of the resource, without evidence of the institutional structure and 
decision-making process on natural resources. Hence, to suggest that the concepts of exclusion 
and rivalry represent a vast improvement by elevating these physical and economic attributes to 
an exclusive position may constitute an error. In the absence of a concept regarding the 
institutional rules that individuals develop in relation to natural resources, the economy lacks a 
way of describing a management regime in which a group of co-owners has exclusive use and 
management authority. Given that property is the flow of benefits (produced or natural) and the 
individuals of the group their owners, it may be clarifying to recognize that they have a property 
in common - the term common property may in these circumstances still make sense. It may 
therefore be said that there are not properly common property resources: there are only regimes 
of ownership over certain natural resources under particular conditions and times. That is, natural 
resources can be managed as property. Common property, state property or private property. Or, 
and this is where the confusion persists in the literature, there are some natural resources over 
which there are no recognized property rights. These are called free resources (res nullius) 
(Bromley, 1991). 
         At the level of fisheries, the effort of the 1970s towards the creation of Exclusive Economic 
Zones and the conversion of a regime of free access into a state-owned regime is an example. In 
fact, the physical and economic attributes of exclusion and rivalry will not have had very 
significant changes (exclusion has always been possible for data levels of fishing effort and 
consumption was clearly rival), but the space of individuals towards the redefinition of the 
regime Management. 
          In Seabright (1993), for its part, defining common property resources using the concepts of 
exclusion and rivalry, nevertheless states that, in their sense, these resources are resources for 
which there are property rights that are exercised ( At least in part) by the collectivity of the 
members of the group. The possible absence of a complete set of contractual relations between 
the members of the group does not invalidate that their participation is limited and recognized in 
law or tradition - therefore they cannot be understood as free access resources, at least in the 
sense of having the risk of new users. 
            It should be noted that in this view, the problems of common property resources (in the 
narrower sense of res communes) are typically more complex (since they involve relations 
between specific individuals) but potentially more soluble than the problems of free access. For 
this author, formulas that designate common property resources in a more comprehensive way 
(difficulty of exclusion and rivalry in consumption) allow to integrate also the problems of free 
access since these are only a particular case in which it is not possible to exclude anyone. Also 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1971), in an explicit reference to fisheries, highlights the question of the 
property regime and its institutional basis. For the author the term common property is, in itself, 
confusing when applied to fishing resources outside territorial waters. If no institutional 
decision-making system, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, exists, these resources are 
res-nullius, a class of fugitive resources, rather than res communes, a distinctly different class. 
And warns: the Common property as an institution, usually facilitates the design of a regulatory 
system that affects and conserves resources. If fisheries are identified as a common property 
resource when there is no such institutional basis for regulation, this designation becomes a 
barrier to perceiving public action. 
            Another alternative is suggested by Grima & Berkes (1989), following the work of Dales 
(1975). It is basically about highlighting how property rights are transferred. Considering that 
access to resources (and associated flow of benefits) is concerned, greater or lesser transferability 
of entitlements becomes the central element to consider when allocating resources is at stake. For 
Alchian (1965), what clearly distinguishes private property is the ability to transfer the use. We 
can identify four solutions according to different levels of exclusivity and transferability: 
 
             - The situation of Free Market, where the legitimate rights of use are exchanged for 
money through free market institutions, as opposed to the situation of free access, with rights of 
free access to resources, in a tradition of unrestricted use; 
             - The next solution to a public property regime where rights of use are administered by a 
government with a centralized bureaucracy, regulations and courts, as opposed to the situation in 
which (non-exclusive) use rights are negotiated And exchanged involving fraudulent activities 
carried out by unscrupulous individuals; 
             - Intermediate solutions  
• Which correspond to situations where the exclusivity and transferability of 
rights is not perfectly defined because some of these rights are used in common 
- they have characteristics of communal property : rights of use partly 
privatized and administered by a community of users;  
• Or rights of access to community resources in a tradition reminiscent of the 
freedoms of introduction into rooms granted to the boy in the stateroom. 
 
               In summary: In spite of the undifferentiated use of the term "common property", it is 
convenient to clarify the concept of distinguishing between various property regimes - even the 
importance that this implies in the definition of public policy. 
 
 
Summarizing the various contributions we can differentiate the following idealized types of  
                               Property regimes relevant to common property resources 
 
 
Free access 
(Res nullius) 
Free goods; Rights of use of 
non-exclusive and non-
transferable resources; 
Rights owned in common 
but free access for all (soon 
owned by no one) 
State Property 
(Res publica) 
Possession, management 
and control of the State; 
Public resources for which 
the rights of use and access 
have not been specified 
Community Property 
(Res communes) 
Resource use rights are 
controlled by an identifiable 
group (not privatized or 
managed by the 
Government); There are 
rules about who can use the 
resource, who is excluded 
and how it should be used; 
System of community-based 
resources; Common 
property 
 
 
 
     THE CASE OF FISHERIES 
     In the particular case of fisheries, the problems presented in the previous section are persistent 
poor conceptualization and inadequate use of terms, with negative repercussions in the analysis 
of situations and in the definition of public policies. Of course, the use of the term common 
property persists since fisheries are defined in the law in several countries as "common 
property". However, only in the sense that the resource belongs to the public (res publica) and 
not automatically usable by all users are subject to a set of regulations by Governmental 
organizations. Moreover, the use of the term "common property" is very common in the 
theoretical literature of Fisheries Economics - somewhat in Gordon's (1954) tradition, "pa" of 
modern economic theory of fisheries. Often the use of the concept is confused with that of free 
access. 
       The purpose of this point is precisely to show how the fisheries case is a living example of 
how a resource can be used according to various forms of access, and that what we call common 
property is not one but several categories of property ( Buck, 1989). 
         An example (hopefully!) enough demonstrative: A fish caught on the High Seas, where it is 
not owned by anyone (res nullius) becomes property of the fisherman by virtue of his capture. 
No nation or individual can claim their property prior to their capture. This "deficit" of property 
resides, note, not in the fish itself, but in its location. The same fish if had been caught in a brook 
owned by a Scottish lord, it would be private property. However, if this fish had traveled to the 
Canadian waters of Newfoundland to spawn it would be owned by the State (res publica) and its 
catch would be subject to numerous regulations. Still, the same undifferentiated and peripatetic 
fish, if it had swum to the waters of a tribe of American Indians, would become property of the 
whole community (res communes). Therefore, the common property resource assignment to the 
fish is not correct: it can be res-nullius, res-communes, res publica, or simply private property, 
depending on where it is caught, how and by whom. 
        Moreover, in this field of fisheries, a new concept can take the property issue even further: 
it is the concept of "common heritage" (Christie, 1972; Ribeiro, 1992). The initial idea was 
exposed by Arvid Pardo, Malta's ambassador to the United Nations, for which there are some 
resources that are a common heritage of mankind. They are owned by all and, as they are already 
owned, cannot legally be appropriated by anyone or any State, and should therefore be subject to 
common management. During the discussion of the New Law of the Sea, Pardo complained that 
the concept should be applied to the resources of the Sea outside the limits of national 
jurisdictions (i.e. beyond 200 miles, which constitute the so-called Exclusive Economic Zones). 
Among these would be the high seas fisheries as well as the marine bottom deposits of minerals,  
for example. This new concept would thus appear as a modern alternative to the current view 
that opposes only exclusive property to free and unlimited access, an obsolete distinction from 
the perspective of the proponents. 
           In Buck (1989) is proposed a typology that allows to clarify the management options, 
bearing in mind the different situations in relation to the property, and that includes the nature of 
the resource (fugitive and renewable), the migratory pattern of the fishery (stock common or of 
private jurisdiction, transferable versus non-transferable, exclusive versus non-exclusive) and the 
scale of use (traditional, local, regional, national, international). 
           We are therefore faced with a diversity of situations in relation to property. The 
overcoming of some ideas about fisheries management, and the approximation to reality, 
requires a more careful analysis of this diversity, rather than the uniform consideration of all 
questions about the protective hat of "common property". 
             In Schalager & Ostrom (1992) is proposed a conceptual framework of general analysis 
for natural resources that can be very useful in the case of fisheries. For these authors, in 
conducting and organizing their daily activities, individuals engage in different levels of action - 
merely operational, collective choice, or even constitutional choice. 
              Operational activities are restricted to (and can be predicted through) rules established at 
operational level (considered basic) irrespective of the origin of these rules, these being 
understood as prescriptions that require, prohibit or allow certain actions for more than one 
individual. For example: the rule used by fishermen to specify the types of equipment allowed 
for a particular location and type of boat can be seen as an operating rule. 
             These can still be changed to the higher level: constitutional level. A set of fishermen 
who set up a marketing cooperative or a PO in the context of the Common Fisheries Policy are 
involved in rules of constitutional choice as they imply decisions at the level of policy definition. 
     It should be noted that, in this context, the terms rules and rights are not used, as is sometimes 
the case, as identifiable. It must be recognized that rights are the product of rules and not 
properly equivalent. The rights refer to particular actions that are authorized; Rules, to the 
requirements which authorize them. The concept of rule relates here to shared ideas about 
prescriptions that affect more than an individual. Whether they are operational, collective choice, 
constitutional choice, rules guide individuals to carry out the actions they require or allow, and 
avoid taking prohibited actions. Thus, a property right can be understood as the authority to take 
action in relation to a specific domain (which also implies duties). The rules specify both. 
With respect to resources which stock is common, the most relevant property rights at the 
operational level are: 
 
       Access and catchability (Withdrawal) 
       Access is the right to enter a defined physical property and withdrawal is the right to obtain 
the product of the resource (in this case, the catch). If a group of fishermen has access rights, 
they have the authority to search for the resource; the rules specify the necessary requirements to 
be able to exercise this right: licensing, quotas, lottery, etc. (See Scott (1986) or Wilson (1982)). 
       Individuals who have access and possibility of withdrawal may or may not have more 
extensive rights that allow them to participate in 2nd level actions (collective choice). It is here 
that the distinction between rights from the first level (operational) and the second level 
(collective choice) becomes crucial - it is at bottom the difference between holding a right and 
participating in the definition of future rights to be exercised. 
       Additional definition authority is what makes 2nd  level rights important. These include: 
 
      Management, exclusion and disposal (transferability) 
      The right of management translates into the right to regulate the patterns of use, 
transformation and improvement of the resource. It is a 2nd  level right that authorizes its holders 
to define the 1st level withdrawal rights governing the use of the resource. Thus individuals in 
their possession are allowed to determine who, how and where, can capture, and when and how 
the structure of the resource can be changed. For example, a group of fishermen who establish in 
a limited area various types of catching activities for different areas exercise their management 
rights. 
      The right of exclusion is what determines who has the right of access and how it can be 
transferred. It is thus a right of collective choice that authorizes members to establish operational 
rights of access. Its holders have the authority to define the qualifications that individuals must 
present to have access to resources. For example, when a set of fishermen limit access to fishing 
boats to their fellows from a certain age or use a certain type of technology, they are exercising 
their exclusion rights. 
       Disposal is the ability to sell and / or lease the prior rights. Thus, the right of alienation 
allows the transfer of part or all of all 2nd  level rights to an individual or group. Exercising this 
right means selling / leasing the management and / or exclusion rights. 
       It should be noted that a number of fishermen who change the conditions of access by 
expanding the number of licenses for a given fishing zone are not, therefore, entitled to sell, 
insofar as they do not transfer 2nd  level rights For other individuals are only exercising their 
right of exclusion. The right of alienation refers only to the authority to alienate the rights of 
collective choice. In the view of the economist this right of alienation is essential, in that it 
allows resources to be transferred to their most valuable use (Coase, 1960). The analysis of the 
different forms of alienation constitutes an essential field of study. 
      These rights, or bundles of rights, are a very common term in the terminology of the Theory 
of Property Rights, can be combined in different ways. They lead us to a series of typified 
situations that can act as a framework for conceptual analysis for the study of different fisheries, 
and in our essential for the analysis and interpretation of the development of certain fisheries 
subject to sensitive changes in their institutional framework. 
 
                    “Bundles” / bundles of rights associated with different positions 
 
        Owner    Proprietary 
 
   Applicant Authorized User 
Access and 
Withdrawal 
 
           X 
 
          X 
 
         X 
 
          X 
Management            X           X          X  
Exclusion            X           X   
Alienation            X              
 
 
      Individuals who have access and withdrawal rights call authorized users. If so specified in 
the form of operational rules, these rights may be transferred temporarily or permanently to 
others. It should be noted, however, that this transfer is not equivalent to the disposal of 
management and exclusion rights. Users' rights are defined at a second level by others. At 
Schalager and Ostrom this situation is exemplified with the much-discussed case of salmon 
fishing in Canada. In the case, there is an Entry Commission that determines the number of 
licenses available and distributes them among fishermen. Each fisherman may not hold more 
than one fishing license, but from time to time the licenses are transferable. Fishers are thus users 
in so far as they are given access and withdrawal rights, but do not enter into the collective 
choice of these rules, defined and imposed at the level of the Central Government. 
      Applicants may be called to individuals who, in addition to their access and withdrawal 
rights, also have the right to management. Through this, applicants have the authority to establish 
withdrawal rules at an operational level, but they neither can specify who has access to the 
resources, nor can alienate this right of management. One example is what we can find in the 
fishery in Jambudjip, India, where fishermen establish rules for the use and coordination of 
fishing activities on different fishing vessels but do not have the right to establish who should be 
allowed access. In the background, there is a situation in which fishing grounds are allocated and 
fishermen have the possibility to establish their own rules of use but have no role in the decision 
on access to resources - something that brings us closer to an undifferentiated mix of "res 
publica" with the communal rights of Alchian and Demsetz (1973). 
      Owners are individuals who have rights to the 2nd level of participation in decisions about 
management and exclusion. Thus, owners can authorize access and establish rules of resource 
use, but they cannot alienate these rights of collective choice. It is on them that the case studies 
on "common property" regimes have focused. Let us say that, in this sense, the authors of this 
conceptualization use the term "common property" to mean collective use with some form of 
government regulation or self-regulation (Terrebone, 1995). 
      A significant example is found in cod fishing in the Terra Nova area (Coelho, 1999). For a 
certain type of gear (with a trap), fishermen (only those in the area) have to enter a lottery which 
guarantees a "cradle" in the fishing net, and since 1919 the lottery system has been codifying the 
limits of jurisdiction for each community (Acheson, 1981). Fishermen, however, cannot sell their 
management and exclusion rights. 
      Owners are individuals who, in addition to prior rights, still hold the rights of alienation. 
Miller (1989) gives us an example by fishing for lobster in the area of Ascencion Bay, Mexico. 
The fishermen involved in this activity belong to a cooperative and divide the available space 
into plots. For each allocated portion the fisherman holds a complete set of rights, including the 
right to sell his portion, immediately losing the possibility of exercising his rights of 
management and exclusion in the area. 
      It should be noted, however, that the divestiture rights can be exercised in full but also only 
partially and for a limited time. Alchian and Demsetz (1973) point out that the bundles of rights 
associated with a resource are divisible, which sometimes makes the situation hybrid and makes 
it difficult to distinguish between, in particular, private property and state ownership. For 
example: in coastal areas, certain legal agreements between state and companies give rise to 
hybrid situations between applicant and owner, in the case of aquaculture. 
     In turn, Scott (1989) is also moving towards a stronger specification of rights. For the author 
the characteristics that identify a right include: Duration, Flexibility, Exclusiveness, Tribute      
Quality, Transferability and Diversity. 
      It should also be noted that the sources of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
transferability rights are diverse. Thus, they can be monitored by a government whose trades 
explicitly grant users these rights - de jure rights, insofar as they are recognized by legal 
instruments; But may only be 'of fact' rights originating between users who cooperate and define 
these rights among themselves. These rights are very important indeed. In general, the literature 
examining property rights and regulation of fisheries is rather pessimistic in relation to self-
regulation processes, both in terms of efficiency assurance and in relation to the problem of 
species 
   
    FINAL REMARKS 
    As a final note it is underlined how, and to what extent, this conceptualization can be decisive 
in the research on Natural Resource Economics and Environment in general, and Fisheries 
Economics in particular. For there, the way it influences the design of public policy itself. 
First, a penetrating element of analysis must be retained: ownership is relative to use, not 
resource. Therefore, the basic issue, which is sometimes poorly identified in the economic 
analysis of natural resources, in particular as regards fisheries, is the property regime. 
As a consequence, another key issue must be underlined: traditional fisheries literature has 
always pointed to the "common ownership" of these resources as the cause of inefficient use of 
resources. In this logic one can see the constant appeal for the change of property rights, from 
Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) to the present day. However, this question is always posed with 
mistrust even to the most involved researchers. As Dasgupta and Heal (1979) argued, in the case 
of fisheries, it is "technically impossible" to assign pure and simple property. This statement may 
indeed prove to be quite incorrect and, in a way, obscure the analysis. In fact, everything seems 
to indicate that the authors incorrectly identify the right of property - we see the sea and its 
resources as objects, when the essential thing is, we repeat, the question of the regime of use. 
    Thus, if we move to a usage / access regime view we can identify different degrees, different 
property rights and formulas for resource management and use. This allows an approach to the 
most penetrating institutional structure, trying in some way to overcome difficulties and 
impasses of the basic neoclassical model in which the Theory of Renewable Natural Resources is 
based. Changing access and management formulas, it must be acknowledged, is certainly not 
"technically impossible". 
    In the particular case of the Fisheries Economy, both in terms of positive and normative 
analytical research and in the empirical deepening with case studies, one gains in approximation 
to reality and its correct understanding, if not from the identification of fishing as " Common 
property "and as if it were a single situation. It is a reality that has evolved, going through 
different sets of rights, the results of which can be assessed. It is therefore possible to identify 
different institutional structures and to assess their economic and social effects.  
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